

Review

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modern and participatory life in which civil society is in charge of its own fate" (p. 256), without providing any material to support this claim, which is quite integral to his main arguments. Had there been a section on methodology, we would at least have a sense of where such information came from.

Another problem with the book is that the narrative does not always match the theoretical framework. The two main arguments of the book are that Islamic groups in Turkey are the expressions of civil society vis-a-vis the authoritarian state and that these groups are increasingly becoming centered on civil society rather than seizing the state. Yet, Yavuz reveals in Chapters 6–8 that the *Nakşibendi* and *Nurcu* movements, which he presents in Table 1.2 (p. 32) as the exemplars of "society-centric" Islamic groups, have been empowered in conjunction with the official attempts at creating a Turkish-Islamic state and society: their institutions have been funded by central authorities, some of them have collaborated with the national intelligence organization, and their ideologies have become quite nationalistic as a result of their interaction with the Kemalist (secularist-nationalist) state. This mutual constitution between certain sectors of society and the state puts into doubt the author's framework, which conceptually opposes society and state. Moreover, Yavuz himself shows how the most powerful Islamic groups and parties have become exclusive of minority populations (Chapters 8 and 10), while his theory posits that Islamic groups are Turkey's best bet to form an inclusive society (p. 271).

Despite these reservations, I recommend this book to those who want to know more about Islamic currents in Turkey. Judgments about the liberal nature of "Turkish Islam" should be suspended, however, until a scholarly account can really demonstrate this. Such an account would also have to justify the exceptionalism implicit in labeling the political expression of Islam in Turkey as "Turkish," since Islamic ideologies in Turkey have been shaped by translations of the writings of non-Turkish Muslims. Yavuz surprisingly fails to note this foreign influence in his discussion of the development of Islamic ideology in Turkey.

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Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians by Baruch Kimmerling. London, England, Verso, 2003. 234 pp. \$22.00.

Baruch Kimmerling, an Israeli sociologist at the Hebrew University and the University of Toronto, has published an authoritative account of Ariel Sharon's attempts to dissolve the Palestinian national existence. This book offers a powerful indictment of this Israeli Prime Minister.

Professor Kimmerling argues that the election of Sharon as Prime Minister of Israel in 2001 marked a turning point in the character of the Israeli government and its political culture. Under Sharon, Israel became an agent of destruc-

tion for others and for itself. It did so because of its fixation on politicide, the process aimed at dissolving the Palestinian social, political, and economic existence. That process, according to Kimmerling, will ultimately lead to undermining the moral foundation and the very existence of the Jewish state.

Kimmerling traces Sharon's rise to power from his early military days. We learn that Sharon always viewed military service as a means to political office. His military career was colored by his personality and his ambition, as it was by his childhood. His resentment of Arabs is long-term and has roots in his parents' attitudes. His willingness to go to extremes in order to kill Arabs was a hallmark of his military career. The 1953 example of Qibiya is used by Kimmerling to illustrate Sharon's brutality toward the Palestinian Arabs. In that incident, Sharon and the troops under his command blew up forty-five houses while their inhabitants were inside. Sixty-seven men, women, and children died unnecessarily. Sharon's unrestrained drive to kill Arabs was further shown in other incidents and incursions, many of which were later investigated and deemed inappropriate by the establishment.

The most disturbing incident of politicide was that of the horror at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon. Anywhere from 700 to 2,000 Palestinian men, women, and children were slaughtered over a period of two days. The Israeli committee of inquiry, The Kahan Commission, found that Sharon bore a major part of the responsibility for the massacre. At that time, it seemed that Sharon's political career would be over. As we all know, that was not the case. In 2001, Sharon was elected Prime Minister in a landslide victory.

The second part of Kimmerling's book traces the background of Sharon's comeback. It discusses the first Intifada and the consequent Oslo Accords. The eventual failure of the Palestinian National Authority and the peace process as a whole paved the way for Sharon to take the helm of Israeli politics. Sharon's victory was perceived as a mandate to nullify the Israeli-Palestinian agreements, to destroy the Palestinian National Authority, and to regain control over the "Land of Israel" in its entirety. In other words, this was seen as a victory for the settlers who want to keep all of the West Bank and Gaza.

Kimmerling argues that the ascendancy of Sharon to the premiership was the result of a power vacuum left behind by the established Ashkenazi political elite. Sharon's new-found power materialized in Operation Defensive Shield, in which Israeli forces rolled into the West Bank and Gaza to imprison and destroy. Palestinian National Authority infrastructures were devastated, and thousands of Palestinians were imprisoned. Even water treatment facilities and power plants were not spared. Churches, mosques, and schools were also hit. The devastation of the Palestinian infrastructure was almost total. When Palestinians resisted, there was an overwhelming Israeli response.

An interesting assessment is made of the second or al-Aqsa Intifada. Kimmerling points out that the symbol of the first Intifada was the Palestinian child throwing stones, while the suicide bomber was the symbol of the second one. Israelis see the suicide bombings as a proof of the cruel and primitive

Palestinian nature. The Palestinians, on the other hand, see them as a reaction to humiliation, hopelessness, and the perpetual violence by Israel against the Palestinians. Such reactions, Kimmerling argues, reflect the inability of each group to understand its opponent. Clearly, Sharon himself makes no attempt to understand the Palestinians. His vision is focused on destroying them. Even when Sharon talks of a Palestinian state, his aim is to lower Palestinian expectations, crush their resistance, isolate them, and make them submit to some Israeli-imposed arrangement that would eventually lead to their “voluntary” mass migration.

This brings us back to Sharon’s early belief that Jordan is the Palestinian state. He has never deviated from that objective, although his pronouncements may seem to indicate otherwise. Sharon is a pragmatic person, who understands that the international community will not tolerate large-scale ethnic cleansing of the West Bank. Therefore, he continues to plan for a rather limited and dependent Palestinian state in isolated areas of the West Bank, which the Palestinians would accept in return for peace and which would eventually collapse. Its inhabitants, Sharon believes, would leave for Jordan of their own free will.

The current crisis is discussed as being at its deepest right now. Both sides lack adequate leadership. The prospective leadership that does exist is frightening. But a breakthrough is not out of the question. Both peoples are beginning to understand that they are in a no-win situation. Their futures are intertwined. In Kimmerling’s view, without a peaceful resolution to the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, Israel “will become a mere footnote in world history” (p. 217).

Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians is a powerful book. It is easy reading, forces hard questions, and should be read by anyone who cares about justice and humanity.

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The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars by Douglas H. Johnson. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2003. 256 pp. Cloth, \$54.95; paper, \$24.95.

The African continent serves as a living laboratory for exploring at least five types of guerrilla insurgencies: first, national liberation insurgencies directed against colonial empires and white minority regimes unwilling to cede power peacefully, such as the successful struggle of the African National Congress for black majority rule in South Africa; second, national reform insurgencies that seek the overthrow of incumbent regimes, as witnessed by the overthrow in 1997 of Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; third, regionally based reform insurgencies intent on achieving greater rights for their